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Abstract
The inﬂation targeting (IT) regime is 17 years old. With practice of IT now in more than 21
countries, there is enough evidence gathered to take stock of the IT experience. In this paper, we
analyze the inﬂation record of IT central banks. We extend the work of Albagli and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2004) by looking at a broad range of factors that can inﬂuence inﬂation target deviations
and by identifying the empirical determinants of successful monetary policy under IT. We ﬁnd
that part of the cross-country and time variation in inﬂation deviations from targets can be
explained by exchange rate movements, ﬁscal deﬁcits, and differences in ﬁnancial sector
development. With respect to the components of the IT framework, we ﬁnd that a higher inﬂation
target and a larger inﬂation control range are associated with more variable inﬂation (and output)
outcomes. Although the literature tends to suggest that greater central bank transparency is
desirable, our ﬁndings imply that transparency might be associated with less satisfactory inﬂation
performance. Interestingly, central banks using economic models do a better job of stabilizing
inﬂation around the target and output around trend.
JEL classiﬁcation: E31, E52, E58
Bank classiﬁcation: Central bank research; Inﬂation targets; Monetary policy framework
Résumé
Les régimes de cibles d’inﬂation ont 17 ans. Aujourd’hui, une vingtaine de pays les ont adoptés.
On dispose donc de sufﬁsamment de données pour dresser un bilan. L’auteur évalue les résultats
obtenus sur le front de l’inﬂation par les banques centrales qui se sont dotées de cibles. Il étoffe à
cet effet le travail d’Albagli et Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) en élargissant le nombre des facteurs
susceptibles d’induire des écarts par rapport au taux d’inﬂation visé et en cernant les déterminants
empiriques du succès de la politique monétaire en régime de cibles d’inﬂation. Il constate qu’une
partie des écarts relevés parmi les pays et dans le temps peut être imputée aux mouvements de
change, aux déﬁcits des ﬁnances publiques et aux différences de développement du secteur
ﬁnancier. En ce qui concerne les caractéristiques proprement dites des régimes, il ressort que le
niveau de l’inﬂation et de la production varie d’autant plus que le taux visé est élevé et que la
fourchette de maîtrise de l’inﬂation est large. À l’encontre des résultats présentés dans la
littérature, qui sont favorables à une plus grande transparence de la part des banques centrales,
ceux de l’étude donnent à penser que le comportement de l’inﬂation se détériore en présence
d’une transparence accrue. Fait intéressant, les banques centrales qui emploient des modèlesiv
économiques réussissent mieux à maintenir l’inﬂation près de la cible et la production près des
valeurs tendancielles.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E31, E52, E58
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Recherches menées par les banques centrales; Cibles en matière
d’inﬂation; Cadre de la politique monétaire2
1. Introduction
Inflation targeting (IT) is becoming an increasingly popular monetary policy framework. It was first 
adopted by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1990, followed by the Bank of Canada in 1991 and 
the Bank of England in 1992. Since then, five other industrial economies and 13 emerging market 
economies have joined the group and new ones are added each year. The U.S. Federal Reserve is 
also considering the adoption of IT.1 The IT regime is 17 years old. With practice of IT now in more 
than 21 countries, there is enough evidence gathered to take stock of the IT experience.
Although there is ample literature on the macroeconomic effects of IT, a very limited number of papers 
look at the inflation performance of central banks under IT. Inflation outcomes may be the result of 
several other factors than monetary policy, especially in the case of small open economies. 
Nevertheless, on average, a successful IT central bank should be expected to hit its target.What is the 
relative success of IT central banks in hitting their target? 
At the same time, there is a general agreement among central bankers and academics that central 
bank transparency (i.e. the extent to which an institution discloses information that is related to the 
policymaking process) is key to successful monetary policy. According to the International Monetary 
Fund, the effectiveness of monetary policy can be strengthened if the goals and instruments of policy 
are known to the public.2 If greater effectiveness of policy is indeed associated with greater 
transparency, then we should expect more transparent central banks to have a better inflation record. 
What are the institutional determinants of inflation deviations once exogenous economicshocks are 
controlled for? Do the characteristics of the monetary policy framework (e.g. central bank
transparency) matter for the inflation performance?
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the inflation performance of IT central banks with a
focus on the empirical role of macroeconomic shocks, the financial environment, and the 
characteristics of the monetary policy framework. In particular, we perform regression-based tests of
the hypothesis that greater central bank transparency reduces inflation deviations from targets. The
key findings can be summarized as follows:
• Thecross-country and time variation of inflation outcomes relative to targets is substantial;
• Part of this dispersion can be explained by exchange rate movements, fiscal deficits, and 
differences in financial sector development;
1 Meyer and Sack (2006). Chairman Bernanke is in favour of IT (Bernanke, 2003).
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• Central banks using a higher inflation target and a larger control range tend to havelarger inflation 
deviations from target or center of target range (and bigger output gaps);
• Measures of transparency are either uncorrelated or positively correlated withinflation deviations;
• Central banks using models do a better job of stabilizing inflation and output;
• Inflation deviationsare negatively correlated with central bank independence.
Our findings could have practical applications. For instance, a better understanding of the 
determinants of inflation target deviations could be useful to central banks debating the adoption of
some form of IT. It could also help IT countries improve the design of their monetary policy framework 
by learning from successful IT central banks.
This paper is divided into 6 sections. Section 2 discusses the literature on the IT experience and 
provides some theoretical and empirical facts regardingcentral bank transparency. Section 3 
establishes key stylized facts on the inflation record of IT central banks. Section 4 presents an 
empirical examination of the factors that influence central bank performance under IT. Section 5
proposes some lessons to learn from our findings and section 6 provides a conclusion.
2. Literature Review
We begin with a survey of the literature on the international experience with inflation targetsand then
summarize the key conclusions of the research on the role of central bank transparency.
2.1 The Inflation Targeting Experience
It is not possible to discuss the literature on IT without mentioning the ongoing debate regarding the 
benefits of adopting an inflation target.3 The main conclusions of this debate are well summarized in 
Mishkin (2006):
• Inflation and interest rate levels have declined following the adoption of IT;
• Output volatility has not increased following the adoption of IT;
• Exchange rate pass-through seems to be attenuated following the adoption of IT;
• IT countries have not done better than non-IT countries since these developments were also 
experienced by non-IT countries;
• Inflation persistence is lower in IT countries;
• Inflation expectations appear to be better anchored in IT countries.
3 This debate has generated many papers. See Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004), Orphanides and Williams 
(2005), Ball and Sheridan (2005), and Gurkaynak et al (2006) to name but a few.4
The macroeconomic benefits of IT remain a source of debate. There is a consensus, however, that IT 
has led to substantial improvements in the practical aspects of monetary policy. These improvements 
include a more systematic and consistent internal decision process, more transparent communication 
with the private sector, and a high degree of accountability (Svensson, 2005). No central bank has 
given up IT, regardless of the magnitude, duration, and frequency of inflation target misses. Roger and 
Stone (2005) point out that this is due to the flexibility of the framework in handling shocks, high
standards of transparency and accountability, and the lack of a credible alternative monetary regime.
Similarly, Paulin (2006) looks at the evolution of the IT arrangements of industrial countries and 
concludes that the resilience of the regime is attributable to its credibility and flexibility.
Roger and Stone also review the institutional elements of IT frameworks (i.e. the definition of the target
in terms of level, range, horizon, and measure) and examine the inflation record of central banks under 
IT. When comparing actual and targeted inflation they find that:
• Deviations are substantial and vary considerably across countries;
• There is a greater dispersion of inflation outcomes around targets in emerging market economies
relative to developed countries;
• There is a bias around the target, as countries in a disinflation process tend to overshoot the
target, while countries with stable targets tend to undershoot the target;
• The persistence of deviations of inflation from the target is consistent with the typical monetary
policy transmission lags.
Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) is the closest study to ours. Theylook at a number of descriptive 
statistics of the IT experience and perform a panel analysis of deviations of actual inflation from the 
target. When controlling for exchange rate shocks, they find that the target level and the size of the 
target range are key determinants of inflation target deviations. They also find a role for central bank 
independence and policy credibility.4
2.2 Central Bank Transparency
The optimal monetary policy literature favours greater transparency. Central banks should 
communicate their complete state-contingent rule given the forward-looking behaviour of economic 
agents (Woodford, 2005).  Orphanides and Williams (2005) show that the monetary authority is able to
achieve a substantially better inflation-output gap stabilization trade off when private agents fully 
4 Policy credibility is proxied by the International Country Risk Guide measure of institutional quality and various
country risk premia.5
understand the equilibrium dynamics implied by the central bank’s policy rule. As Woodford notes, 
better information on the part of financial markets about central bank actions and intentions increases 
the effectiveness of monetary policy in that the actual changes in the overnight rate required to achieve 
the desired changes in incentives can be much more modest when expected future rates move as 
well.5 In unison with Woodford, Svensson (2005) notes that additional progress in the conduct of 
monetary policy could be made by central banks being more specific, systematic, and transparent 
about their operational objective, their forecasts, and their communications. More transparent central 
banks should be expected to have a better inflation record. Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (2003)show
that the variance of inflation is a positive function of the lack of central bank transparency perceived by 
the public.
Although greater transparency may be desirable, it may not be feasible.Macklem (2005), Goodhart 
(2001, 2005), and Mishkin (2004) argue that the complete state-contingent rule is too complex for a 
central bank to work out anytime soon. Inaddition, Morris and Shin (2002) show that when the level of 
some variable is highly uncertain (e.g. potential output, fundamental asset prices) and the central bank 
is unlikely to have superior information about it compared to the private sector, disclosure of the 
associated estimate causes financial market participants to ignore their private information and 
coordinate on the noisy disclosed target, leading to greater volatility. According to Cukierman (2005), 
full transparency may not be optimal in all instances: problems in the financial system and 
disagreements within the monetary policy committeeare situations in which less transparency may be 
preferable. Yet, there appears to be room for further innovations in transparent monetary policy, as 
shown by the recent decision of the Swedish Riksbank to publish interest rate path projections and the 
enthusiasm of Svensson (2006) regarding the experience of Norway in that respect.6
There is general agreement among central bankers that transparency is a key aspect of monetary 
policy implementation. In a survey of 94 central banks, Fry et al (2000) find that 74 per cent of 
respondents consider transparency a “vital” or “very important” component of their monetary policy 
framework.7 Using the same survey, Geraats (2005) finds, however, that central banks are not 
transparent in all respects. She notes that, while it is common to provide an explanation of policy 
5 As Svensson (2006) notes, it is not the current level, but ratherprivate-sector expectations of the entire future 
path of the interest rate that matters for the economy. These expectations feed into longer term interest rates and 
asset prices, which affect private-sector decisions.
6 In addition, Rudebusch and Williams (2006) show that, in a New Keynesian model, central communication of 
interest rate projections may improve macroeconomic performance.
7 Only independence of the central bank and the maintenance of low inflation expectations are rated higher. See 
Jenkins (2004) for more details on the importance of transparency in conducting monetary policy in Canada.6
changes on the day of a change to the instrument rate and to include forecasts in regular central bank 
reports and bulletins, it is unusual to publishvoting records and minutesof monetary policy committee
meetings.Two papers attempt to measure transparency. Based on the information published by 
central banks and other government sources, Eijffinger and Geraats (2005) construct an index of 
central bank transparency for nine countries.8 While this measure quantifies the degree of openness of 
central banks based on the information provided, it does not necessarily reflects the true degree of 
understanding by the public of central banking practices. This weakness motivated Kia and Patron 
(2004) to develop a market-based transparency index. Available only for the United States, their index 
covers the period 1982-2003 and has the advantage of reflecting what market participants understand
from the Federal Reserve’s actions and signals.
Often taking the form of event studies, the empirical literature generally comes to the conclusion that 
greater central bank transparency is beneficial. Chortareas et al (2002) show that the publication of 
more detailed central bank forecasts reduces average inflation in a cross-section of 82 countries. 
Geraats et al (2006), use the central bank transparency index of Eijffinger and Geraats (2005) and find 
some evidence that greater transparency reduces interest rates in 8 industrial economies. In the case 
of Canada, Parent et al (2003) find that the introduction of a schedule of dates for policy interest rate 
announcements increased the predictability of the Bank of Canada’s interest rate decisions and the
financial markets’ understanding of Canadian monetary policy.9 Not all central bank communication 
channels are as efficient, however. For the United States, Reinhart and Sack (2006) find that the
testimonies of central bank officials before Congress and FOMC statements are more effective than 
speeches by individual Committee members. This is not surprising given that testimonies and 
statements reflect a consensus view while speeches reflect personal views. None of these papers look 
at the impact of central bank transparency on the success in hitting the inflation target.
3. Stylized Facts of the Inflation Targeting Experience
Since official inflation targets provide a clear benchmark against which monetary policy can be 
evaluated, we measure the inflation performance of central banks under IT in terms of deviations of 
realizedtotal year-over-year CPI inflation from targeted inflation(at the quarterly frequency). Although
some central banks emphasize a core measure of the CPI, we prefer to use total inflation since the 
official target variable is always defined in terms of total inflation, which is most relevant to the public.
8 According to this index, the most transparent institutions are the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish 
Riksbank, and the Bank of England.
9 Muller and Zelmer (1999) come to similar conclusions with respect to the introduction of the Bank of Canada’s
Monetary Policy Report in 1995.7
For central banks using an inflation control range, we use the midpoint of the band as the numerical
target. This is a realistic assumption since the midpoint of the range is what is aimed for in order to 
maximize chances of maintaining inflation within the band.10
The sample includes 21 IT economies: eight industrial countries (Australia, Canada, Iceland, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and 13 emerging market economies
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines,
Poland, South Africa, and Thailand). 11,12 The country-specific inflation target level or center of target 
range and regime starting dates are taken from Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2005). For most 
countries, these dates cover both declining inflation target (i.e. disinflation) and stable inflationtarget
periods.13 The sample is an unbalanced panel of 699 observations ending in the fourth quarter of 
2005. All statistics are reported in Appendix 1.
As in Paulin (2006), we identify two waves of IT adoption for the industrial economies: one in the first 
part of the 1990s and another around 2000-01 (Table 1). Using 2005Q4 as the last observation, the
average age of the IT regime is about 10 years in industrial economies. Canada, Iceland and New
Zealand went through adisinflation episode, which lasted 3.2 years on average. The 2005 target level
or center of the range is either 2.5 per cent (Australia, Iceland, and Norway) or 2 per cent (Canada,
New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).14
On average, the IT regime is more recent in the emerging market economies (7½ years, Table 2).
Three waves of adoption are identified: the early 1990s (Chile, Israel, and Peru), the late 1990s (Brazil,
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Korea, Mexico, and Poland), and 2000-01 (Hungary, the Philippines,
South Africa, and Thailand). Except for South Africa and Thailand, all countries have been (or are still 
going) through a disinflation phase. As of the end of 2005, the average disinflation period was 6.2 
years, much longer thanthat for industrial countries. This could be due to higher inflation starting 
10 Paulin (2006) notes that, in practice, IT central banks tend to downplay the role of the edges of the range, 
viewing them primarily as a communication tool to provide clarity on the degree of tolerance with respect to the 
variance of inflation.
11 We did not include the euro area in the sample since the European Central Bank does not consider itself an 
inflation targeter. Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) and Roger and Stone (2005) also exclude the euro zone 
from their sample.
12 The Slovak Republic, Indonesia, Romania, and Turkey moved to IT in 2005-06.
13 The stable IT and disinflation periods are also taken from Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2005).
14 In the United Kingdom, the target was reduced from 2.5 to 2 per cent in 2003. This followed from a change in 
the measure of the target variable from the CPI excluding mortgage costs to the European Union’s HICP. The 
Swiss National Bank targets an inflation rate of below 2 per cent, which we equivalently express as a 0 to 2 per 
cent control range (1 per cent numerical target).8
points or lower central bank credibility. With variable size, all emerging market economies (EMEs) use 
an inflation control range. The average of the midpoint of the range was 3.1 per cent in 2005.
The inflation performance of industrial countries is quite good. More than 60 per cent of inflation
deviations from targets are smaller than 1 percentage point (p.p., Figure 1). There is little bias overall 
since 47 per cent of deviations are positive and 53 per cent are negative. Deviations of more than 2 
p.p. occur very rarely. The mean absolute deviation (MAD) from the target is close to 1 p.p. on average
(Table 3). Switzerland ranks first with a MAD of 0.39 p.p., but the evidence is limited since the data
covers only 5 years. The UK has a good performance with a MAD of 0.76 p.p. Canada ranks fourth 
with a MAD of 1.01 p.p., which means that on average, consumer price inflation has been close to the 
edges of the Bank of Canada’s 1 to 3 per cent control band. Iceland, with only 4 years of IT 
experience is the worst performer with a MAD of 1.66 p.p.15 Interestingly, there is no obvious link
between our MAD rankings and the transparency rankings of Eijffinger and Geraats (2005), which 
suggests that inflation performance and transparency might not be correlated.
As in Roger and Stone (2005), we find that central banks tend to overshoot their inflation target during 
disinflation periods. Canada is an exception to this, however, with an undershooting mean of -0.74 p.p.
This result could reflect weaker than anticipated inflation developments in the early 1990s, such as a
more severe than expected recession, unexpectedly slow growth in the U.S. economy, fiscal
consolidation, or trade liberalization. During stable IT periods, the Anglo-Saxon countries and Iceland
have tended to overshoot the target while Norway, Sweden and Switzerland have tended to 
undershoot. On average, there is little bias around the target during stable IT periods (especially true
for Canada). At 6.4 quarters on average, the persistence of inflation deviations, as measured by the 
average duration of deviations from the target, is consistent with the typical structural VAR estimates of 
the response of inflation to a monetary policy shock (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999).
Deviations are the least persistent in Canada (4.8 quarters) and the most persistent in Sweden and 
Iceland (8.2 and 8.5 quarters, respectively). Large inflation deviations, measured by the number of 
times that deviations from the target have been larger than 2p.p. are more frequent in Canada, New
Zealand, and Australia.16 This could reflect higher inflation volatility due to a greater exposure of these 
countries to commodity price shocks. The frequency of being outside of the range during periods of 
stable IT is also reported for countries using target bands. By this metric, Canada has the best 
performance among industrial countries since inflation outcomes have been outside of the target band 
15 We obtain similar qualitative results when using relative deviations instead of absolute deviations.
16 We obtain similar results if we normalize the number of large deviations by the age of the IT regime.9
in only 8 out of 40 quarters. The Australian performance is weaker with year-over-year inflation outside
of the band two thirds of the time.17
The inflation performance is relatively weaker and more heterogeneousin EMEs (Figure 2 andTable
4). About 41 per cent of deviations lie between -1 and +1 p.p. and 36 per cent of deviations are larger 
than 2 p.p. The average MAD is two times larger than that ofthe industrial countries. The worst 
performers are Brazil and South Africa (with MADs of more than 3 percentage points) while Chile, 
Korea, and Thailand have mean absolute deviationscomparable to that oftheindustrial countries. On
average, there is a small bias towards undershooting the inflation target in EMEs. While this is 
surprising, it masks significant differences. For the disinflation periods, Brazil and Hungary overshoot
their target significantly (> 2 p.p.) while Colombia and Korea undershoot their target by 2 and 1.5 p.p.,
respectively. For the stable IT periods, Israel and Mexico have the largest biases around the target.
The persistence of inflation deviations is slightly higher for EMEs (7 quarters on average). It is the 
highest for the Czech Republic, Korea and Mexico and the lowest in Thailand, Peru, Colombia and 
Chile. Large inflation deviations are more frequent in EMEs, especially in Brazil, Israel and Poland.
Although the control range is generally larger, inflation outcomes outside of the bands are also slightly 
more frequent on average.
Taking these results together, it appears that the United Kingdom and Chile are among the best 
inflation performers of the industrial and emerging market economies, respectively. Overall, inflation
deviations are fairly heterogeneous in terms of magnitude, persistence, and frequency. This could be 
the result of differences in exogenous economic shocks, institutions and policy frameworks, or 
commitment to the inflation target. The next section will attempt to quantify the contribution of these 
factors.
4. Empirical Determinants of Central Bank Performance
We extend the work of Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) by looking at a broader range of 
determinants of central bank performance under IT. Recall that these authors examined the role of the 
target level and range, the exchange rate, various measures of risk, and central bank independence. 
Aside from the definition of the inflation target and central bank independence, they did not look at 
factors that are specific to the monetary policy framework. Our contribution is to try to account for
transparency and other institutional measures specific to central bank practices.This will allow us to 
find what makes a successful IT central bank. Since the financial system is a key component of the 
17 Note, however, that the control range is narrower for Australia.10
monetary transmission mechanism, we also look at the role of the financial environment. Krause and 
Rioja (2006) find that higher financial development improves monetary policy efficiency. Given this
finding, we should expect central banks’ success in hitting the inflation target to increase with the 
degree of financial market sophistication.
The criterion we use to definecentral bank performance under IT is absolute inflation deviations, i.e.
the absolute value of year-over-year total CPI inflation minusthe inflation target or center of control
band (hereafter πgap). Another innovation relative to Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) is that we also 
consider specifications in which the dependent variable is a weighted average of inflation deviations 
from the target and output deviations from potential (i.e. central banker’s loss).18 This is a realistic 
exercise since the monetary policy objective typically includes not only stability of inflation around the 
target but also stability of the real economy. It is also consistent with the fact that central banks may 
have to make compromises in the short-run for longer term performance. For instance, in the case of a 
negative supply shock, some central banks may be willing to tolerate higher inflation in the short-run in 
order to minimize the output consequences. Depending on the specification, the dependent variable is
regressed onits own lags and vectors of: lags of macroeconomic control variables (MACRO), financial
environment control variables (ENV), and institutional factors (INST). In panel form with fixed effects, 
the following equation is estimated:
where i corresponds to the 21 IT countries previously described, t is a time index covering various
sample periods ending in 2005Q4, and L is the lag operator. The macroeconomic control variables that 
we use to capture exogenous inflation shocks include lags of the absolute deviations of output, the 
nominal exchange rate, the relative price of oil, and other commodity prices (all relative to their HP-
filtered trend) and various measures of risk.19,20 We also includethe lagged fiscal deficit or debt relative
to GDP to account for the fact that successful disinflations depend on fiscal reforms, especially in 
18 Potential output is estimated with a simple HP filter.
19 We use the nominal exchange rate to be consistent with Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004). The real 
exchange rate provides comparable results since the absolute value of the exchange rate gap is very similar in 
real and nominal terms. This reflects the fact that exchange rate deviations from trend generally occur because
of movements in the nominal value of the exchange rate rather than in relative prices. Since inflation in smaller 
and more open economies is likely to be more exposed to foreign developments, we also tried openness to trade 
and country size as explanatory variables of inflation deviations. The macroeconomic control variables are 
lagged to avoid the issue of simultaneity.
20 Although the HP filter has a number of caveats (e.g. its parametrization is arbitrary, it uses future information, 
and it is biased at the end of the sample), we opt for this methodology to be consistent with Albagli and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2004) and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2005).
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EMEs. Financial environment control variables can be grouped into variables that capture the degree 
of financial market development (index of financial market sophistication, stock market capitalization or 
turnover relative to GDP)and the health of thebanking sector (indexes of bank financial soundness or 
strength, market share of state-owned banks).
Central banks’ institutional determinants are grouped into three categories: IT design, transparency
proxies, and other. The first category includes the inflation target level, the size of the target range, and
the policy horizon (i.e. the period over which inflation is expected to return to the target).21 Since
central banks might become better at targeting inflation with the accumulation of experience, we also 
try the age of the IT regime. Instead of trying to build indexes of central bank transparency such as 
those described in section 2, we use various proxiesof the degree of openness of monetary
institutions in their communications with the public.22 We use the number of inflation reports published 
per year, the provision of quantitative forecasts, andthe publication of minutes or voting records of
monetary policy committee (MPC) meetings. Finally, although not directly related to the concept of 
transparency, we also look at the role of the frequency of official MPC meetings, the use of models
(with more than 10 equations), the size of the MPC, and central bank independence.23
Characteristics of the monetary policy framework (INST)
IT design Transparency Other
• Target level
• Size of target range
• Target horizon
• Age of IT regime
• Number of inflation reports per year
• Provision of quantitative forecasts
• Publication of minutes or voting records
of MPC meetings
• Frequency of MPC meetings
• Use of models
• Size of MPC
• Independence
Note that many of the INST variables depict time variation. For instance, the number of inflation reports 
published per year in Canada changes for 2 to 4 in 2000 and the dummy variables for the publication 
of minutes or voting records of MPC meetings take the value of 1 if and when such an option is used
by the central bank. Appendix 2 provides the exact definition and source of all the explanatory 
variables that we considered as potential determinants of inflation target deviations and central
bankers’ loss and reports selected descriptive statistics for the INST variables.
21 Given that most central banks do not officially announce a control horizon, we infer it from the horizon of the 
inflation forecasts found in central banks’ inflation reports.
22 The Kia and Patron (2004) measure relies on Fed Funds rate and Treasury bill rate daily data, making it 
virtually impossible to reproduce for many countries. The index by Eijffinger and Geraats (2005) covers only 9 
industrial countries and does not vary over time.
23 When possible, we also tried squared transformations of these variables to see if there is an optimal level of 
transparency. The results were qualitatively similar, but the coefficients were generally smaller.12
We begin with a simple cross-section regression with each variable evaluated at its sample mean.
Table 5 in Appendix 3 reports the statistically significant determinants of inflation deviations. In all 
cases, we use the general-to-particular approach to determine the final specification.24 Among the
macroeconomic variables, we find that absolute exchange rate deviations and the fiscal deficit are
positivedeterminants of inflation target misses. The significance of the exchange rate is not a surprise 
given that most of the countries in the sample are small open economies. A drop in the fiscal deficit to
GDP ratio of 2 percentage points (equivalent to going from Poland’s to Switzerland’s average deficit)
reduces inflation deviations from the target by a sizable 0.43 percentage points. The insignificance of 
the output gap could be explained by a flattening of the Phillips curve during the 1990s.25 The
insignificance of oil prices is a surprise, especially given that we are looking at total inflation.26 We are 
able to obtain a larger (but barely significant) impact by interacting the oil price variable with a measure 
of country oil intensity. As we might expect, increased soundness of private commercial banks reduces
inflation target deviations. A rise in the index of 1 point (equivalent to a change from Brazil to United 
Kingdom banking sector health) reduces inflation deviations by 0.37 percentage points. In terms of the 
characteristics of the monetary policy framework, we find that, although with relatively weak t-statistics,
a higher inflation target value and a wider target range both increase deviations.27 This is in line with 
Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) and suggests that a lower target will be easier to hit on average.
Finally, we find that central banks withpolicy instrument independence have significantly better
inflation outcomes, which probably reflects a stronger ability to commit to price stability (Cukierman et 
al, 1992). The other institutional measures, including the age of the IT regime and the proxies for
transparency, are all statistically insignificant. Taken together, these regressors explain 70 per cent of 
the cross-country variation in absolute inflation deviations.
While introducing a time dimension to the data yields similar results, it also increases the number of 
statistically significant determinants. Table 6 reports these determinants. The pooled panel regression
24 Unless otherwise mentioned, all equations have been estimated using standard OLS. Given that the 
dependent variable is censored for negative observations, we also considered the Tobit estimator but did not find 
any differences in the value or standard error of the parameter estimates.
25 For instance, Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) find that this could be due to a lower frequency of price 
adjustments when inflation is low. This does not imply that inflation is not affected by demand and supply 
conditions, but rather suggests that the policy rate has moved in such a way that excess demand has not 
translated into actual inflation.
26 Commodity prices, country size, trade openness, and the different measures of risk examined by Albagli and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) are also not statistically significant. The lack of significance of the risk variables could be 
due to the fact that this concept is captured by other (e.g. fiscal) variables in the equation.
27 While this result may reflect the fact that the variability of inflation declines with its level, the same result holds 
in a model of proportional instead of absolute inflation deviations.13
shows that there isa high persistence in inflation deviations from the target (the sum of the two lags is 
0.61). Exchange rate deviations and the fiscal deficit (now with a one-quarter lag) remain positive
contributors to deviations. The only financial environment control variable that is statistically significant
is the index of private banks’ financial strength, for which a 1 point rise reduces deviations by a small 
0.03 percentage points (the index ranges from 2 to 10). With respect to the monetary policy
framework, the size of the target range remains positively correlated with inflation target misses, while
central bank independencecontinues to be associated with better performance. Unexpectedly, we find 
that central banks that publish the minutes or voting records of their MPC meetings tend to miss their 
target by more than those that do not. This could be because minutes and voting records sometimes 
exposethe disagreements within the MPC, which could imply that full transparency may be sub-
optimal, as suggested by Cukierman (2005). Another reason could be that the transparency 
requirement may act as a constraint on policy by reducing flexibility and introducing bureaucracy. 
Central banks with larger MPCs have a slightly better inflation performance, consistent with the idea 
that, although with some obvious limits, a larger number of board members should involve a broader 
range of experiences and perspectives, and hence be better in dealing with uncertainty and processing 
the relevant information (Berger et al, 2006). Finally, although by an economically small amount, a
longer inflation control horizon lowers inflation deviations. This could suggest that by giving more 
attention to the medium term, the monetary authority is able to better anchor private-sector inflation 
expectations. With an adjusted R2 of 66 per cent, the model fits the data reasonably well.
The addition of country-specific fixed effects in the panel estimation reduces the number of possible 
determinants to test since some of them are time-invariant and therefore need to be dropped in the 
presence of country dummy variables. Again, inflation deviations have considerable persistence, with 
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable summing to about 0.59 (Table 7). Exchange rate
deviationsand the fiscal deficit continue to be the main macroeconomic variables correlated with 
inflation deviations. Private banks’ financial strength remains statistically significant while a higher 
level for the inflation target leads to larger misses. The publication of minutes continues to be positively 
correlated with absolute inflation deviations, although the precision of the coefficient is weak.
The previous specification might suffer from endogeneity due to the presence of the lagged dependent 
variable among the regressors and the fixed effects characterizing the heterogeneity of the countries.
The OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent in this context. To eliminate the potential correlation
between the lagged dependent variable and the error term, we use the instrumental variable 14
estimator.28 The main findings from the previous regression are unaltered, suggesting that endogeneity 
is perhaps not a serious problem (Table 8).
Turning to the central banks’loss function, we examine three definitions of the dependent variable:
• Absolute loss: 0.5*|πgap|+0.5*|ygap|;
• Quadratic loss with equal weights: 0.5*(πgap)2+0.5*(ygap)2;
• Quadratic loss with estimated weights: 0.8*(πgap)2+0.2*(ygap)2;
where πgap is the inflation deviationfrom target and ygap is the output gap. In addition to equal weights 
on output and inflation in the loss function, we also consider the weights from the estimated Taylor
frontiers of Cecchetti and Krause (2002). In that case, the weight on inflation is 0.8 for every country 
except Chile, Israel, and Mexico (set at 0.3).29 Estimation results with loss as the dependent variable
are reported in Tables 9, 10, and 11. Not surprisingly, in addition to lags of inflation deviations, lags of 
the absolute value of the output gap are now statistically significant. The lagged exchange rate gap 
and the fiscal deficit are positively correlated with loss. Two other macroeconomic control variables are 
now significant: the fiscal surplus relative to GDP and oil price deviations are negatively and positively 
correlated with quadratic loss, respectively (Table 11).30 The only financial environment control 
variable that is statistically significant in regressions of loss is the market share of state-owned banks.
The coefficient is very small and positive, indicating that countries with low private banking sector 
development tend to have more variable output and inflation outcomes. This could be due to many 
things, including a less efficient transmission mechanism. Several characteristics of the monetary 
policy framework are statistically significant. A higher level and a wider control range for the inflation 
target are both associated with larger monetary policy losses. The fact that the range variable remains 
positive and statistically significant in the loss regressions suggests that the benefits of lower output 
variance do not compensate the costs of higher inflation volatility when central banks opt for a wider 
control range. Interestingly, central banks using models to guide the conduct of policy obtain 
significantly lower losses. This result highlights the importance of economic models in monetary policy-
making (Coletti and Murchison, 2002). We also find slight evidence that a greater frequency of official
MPC meetings is associated with improved performance. This could be due to a better timeliness of 
policy decisions or to transparency benefits in that more frequent meetings allow the central bank to 
28 More precisely, the two lags of the dependent variable are instrumented with the other right-hand side 
regressors.
29 Such weights for Chile are questionable given the country’s good inflation record since the adoption of IT. 
30 Oil gaps are rarely significant, which could reflect the fact that some of the IT countries produce oil.15
convey its view to the public more efficiently. The age of the IT regime remains insignificant, which 
suggests that central bank performance does not improvewith the accumulation of experience. Finally,
as in the regressions using inflation deviations only, the publication of minutes is harmful to 
performance.
In section 3, we saw that there are differences in the inflation performance between stable inflation
target periods and disinflation periods and between industrial countries and EMEs. This raises the 
possibility that part of the cross-country and time variation in inflation deviations might simply be
captured by dummy variables for EMEs or for stable IT periods. We test for this by introducing dummy 
variables accounting for these factors in interaction both with the constant and the regressors. The 
main results are unaltered since the initial coefficient estimates do not change materially and all the
dummy variables are statistically insignificant. The only exception is for the publication of minutes and 
voting records in which case there is some evidence of a decline in the parameter during stable IT 
periods. Yet, the coefficient remains positive and statistically significant, which indicates that publishing 
minutes deteriorates performance, but less so in a stable IT regime.
Another issue relates to the possibility of endogeneity. For instance, it may be that central banks opt
for a wider control range or chose to publish MPC minutes because inflation is more volatile rather 
than the opposite. This possibility would, however, be more likely if these choice variables were 
constant over time. The fact that target deviations increase both if and when a central bank decides to 
publish its MPC minutesreduces the risk of reverse causality.
5. Lessons
Table 12 recapitulates the variables considered in the empirical analysis and their correlation with 
absolute inflation deviations and loss. In summary, our key findings are:
• Deviations of total inflation from targeted inflation are persistent;
• Inflation deviationsand loss are correlated with exchange rate movements and fiscal deficits;
• Inflation deviations and loss are negatively correlated with private banking sector health;
• Inflation deviations and loss increase with the target level and the size of the control range;
• Results for transparency are disappointing: inflation deviations and loss are positively correlated 
with the publication of MPC minutes or voting records and are not correlated with the other
transparency measures;
• Theuse of models helps central banks stabilize inflation around target and output around trend;
• Inflation performance is strongly correlated with central bank independence.16
What possible lessons can we learn from these findings?
Lesson 1: Frequent macroeconomic shocks imply that deviations from an inflation target are
unavoidable. When such shocks happen, we should expect total inflation to remain away from target 
for a relatively prolonged period, especially when fiscal policy is loose or in the presence of an 
unhealthybanking sector. The persistence of deviations, combined with the inherent imprecision of IT, 
is perhaps why many central banks use an inflation control range. 
Lesson 2: While there are advantages in communicating the inflation target in terms of a range, central
banks opting for such a framework should expect to experience larger deviations around the median
point of the range on average. The fact that central bankers’ loss is also positively correlated with the 
size of the target range suggests that the benefits of lower output variance do not offset the costs of 
letting inflation vary when central banks opt for a wider control range.
Lesson 3: Although imperfectly measured, greater central bank transparency does not seem to 
guarantee better output and inflation outcomes. In fact, our transparency proxies tend to suggest that it
might lead to less satisfactory performance. This contrasts with the theoretical and empirical literature 
concluding that greater transparency is desirable. In fact, our results give some credit to the thesis that
transparency has limits. To some extent, these results could have been expected given the absence of 
correlation between our MAD rankings and the transparency rankings of Eijffinger and Geraats (2005),
as we saw in section 3. Our findings hint that, even if we control for shocks, transparency per se is
probably not an element that will help IT central banks hit the target. Yet, they do not imply that central 
bankers should move away from transparency. Indeed, the presence of lags between changes in the 
stance of monetary policy and their impact on inflation imply that the actions and intentions of the 
central bank need to remain transparent in order for the public to monitor the commitment of the 
institution to adhering to the inflation target.
6. Conclusion
When comparing deviations of actual inflation from targeted inflation for 21 IT countries over the period
1990-2005, we find that the ability of central banks to hit their target varies a lot. The United Kingdom 
and Chile are among the best inflation performers of the industrial and emerging market countries,
respectively. Canada has also a very good inflation record. The empirical analysis suggests that part of 
the cross-country and time variation in inflation deviations can be explained by exchange rate 
movements andfiscal deficits. In line with Krause and Rioja (2006), we find some evidence that 
banking sector development is positively correlated with meeting targets more consistently. With 17
respect to central banks’ institutional characteristics, our key findings are in line with Albagli and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2004): a higher inflation target and a wider control range are associated with more
variable output and inflation outcomes while the opposite is true for central bank independence.
Contrary to our expectations, measures of central bank transparency are either uncorrelated or 
positively correlated with inflation deviations and loss.
What makes a successful IT central bank? Results suggest that, in order to minimize inflation 
deviations from target and output deviations from trend, the monetary policy framework would gain 
from having the following features: a low numerical target, a relatively narrow control range, 
confidentiality of MPC minutes or voting records, the use of economic models to guide policy 
decisions, and independence from the government. 
As a future step to this research, a theoretical framework along the lines of Demertzis and Hughes 
Hallett (2003) would be helpful to formalize the link between central bank transparency and inflation 
performance and to better justify the specification of the empirical model. We could also try to obtain 
other measures of the financial environment and central bank transparency or consider a definition of 
performance based on core inflation. Examining the impact of the legal mandate (i.e. whether the 
central bank has an exclusive price stability directive) on performance would also be of interest.
Simple extensions to the analysis presented here would allow us to contribute to the debate regarding 
the relative advantages of adopting an IT strategy. For instance, we could add non-IT economies to 
the sample and redefineperformance in terms of inflation deviations relative to a trend. Alternatively,
we could argue that central bank performance should be measured by the degree to which inflation 
expectations remain anchored in the face of shocks (c.f. Levin et al (2004)). In that case, we could look 
at the role of the inflation target, central bank transparency, andthe other factors listed in this paper,
as potential determinants of inflation persistence.18
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Appendix 1: Stylized facts of the inflation targeting experience
Table 1: Inflation targeting key dates (industrial economies)
IT start Disinflation Stable IT 2005 IT level
Australia 1994Q3 1994Q3→ 2-3
Canada 1991Q1 →1995Q4 1996Q1→ 1-3
Iceland 2001Q1 →2002Q4 2003Q1→ 2.5
New Zealand 1990Q1 →1992Q4 1993Q1→ 1-3
Norway 2001Q1 2001Q1→ 2.5
Sweden 1995Q1 1995Q1→ 1-3
Switzerland 2000Q1 2000Q1→ <2
United Kingdom 1992Q1 1992Q1→ 2
Average 9.7 years 3.2 years 7.8 years 2.1
Source: Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2005) and author’s calculations.
Table 2: Inflation targeting key dates (EMEs)
IT start Disinflation Stable IT 2005 IT level
Brazil 1999Q1 → 2-7
Chile 1991Q1 →2000Q4 2001Q1→ 2-4
Colombia 1999Q1 → 4.5-5.5
Czech Rep. 1998Q1 → 2-4
Hungary 2001Q1 → 2.5-4.5
Israel 1992Q1 →2002Q4 2003Q1→ 1-3
Korea 1998Q1 →1998Q4 1999Q1→ 2.5-3.5
Mexico 1999Q1 →2002Q4 2003Q1→ 2-4
Peru 1994Q1 →2001Q4 2002Q1→ 1.5-3.5
Philippines 2001Q1 → 5-6
Poland 1998Q1 →2003Q4 2004Q1→ 1.5-3.5
South Africa 2001Q1 → 3-6
Thailand 2000Q1 → 0-3.5
Average 7.5 years 6.2 years 3.3 years 3.1
Source: Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2005) and author’s calculations.22
Figure 1: Inflation outcomes relative to target (industrial economies)
Frequency (per cent) of inflation deviations larger than -4 percentage points (p.p.), between -4 and -2 p.p., 
between -2 and -1 percentage points, and so on.















Australia 1.21 7 5 0.15 7.2 11 31/46
Canada 1.01 4 4 -0.74 0.01 4.8 9 8/40
Iceland 1.66 8 -- 2.58 0.30 8.5 5 --
New Z. 0.98 3 1 0.89 0.52 6.1 7 12/32
Norway 1.15 6 -- -0.73 5.7 3 --
Sweden 1.14 5 2 -0.86 8.2 5 23/44
Switzerland 0.39 1 6 -0.05 5.3 0 --
UK 0.76 2 3 0.20 5.3 0 --
Average 1.04 -- -- 0.91 -0.06 6.4 5 44%
Author’s calculations. MAD: mean absolute deviation of actual inflation from target, bias: mean of inflation 
deviations, persistence: average duration of inflation deviations, large deviations: inflation deviations greater than 
2 percentage points, beyond bands: number of times that inflation is outside of the range during stable IT 
periods. EG rank: Eijffinger and Geraats (2005) transparency rankings.23
Figure 2: Inflation outcomes relative to target (EMEs)
See Figure 1 footnote.













Brazil 3.58 13 2.51 8.3 16 --
Chile 1.09 2 0.66 -0.53 4.4 8 5/20
Colombia 2.21 6 -2.03 4.2 14 --
Czech R. 2.39 8 -1.00 9.7 13 --
Hungary 2.23 7 2.20 8.5 8 --
Israel 2.39 9 -1.14 -1.77 5.9 30 9/12
Korea 1.29 3 -1.48 -0.53 9.7 6 9/24
Mexico 1.84 5 0.15 1.60 12.5 5 9/12
Peru 1.68 4 0.63 -0.45 4.1 12 8/16
Philippines 2.60 11 -1.35 8.5 7 --
Poland 2.57 10 -0.57 0.39 7.3 18 5/8
S. Africa 3.02 12 0.89 5.7 10 12/20
Thailand 0.65 1 -0.02 2.3 0 3/24
Average 2.12 -- -0.13 -0.05 7.0 11.3 50%
See Table 3 footnote.24
Appendix 2: Regression data
Dependent variable:
• Year-over-year growth in total CPI minus (time-varying) inflation target, absolute value, 
International Monetary Fund, IFS (aid).
Macroeconomic control variables (MACRO):
• Output gap: Real GDP minus hp-filtered trend, absolute value, International Monetary Fund, IFS
(aygap).
• Exchange rate: Nominal exchange rate minus hp-filtered trend, absolute value, International 
Monetary Fund, IFS (aexgap).
• Price of oil: Nominal WTI price minus hp-filtered trend, absolute value (aoilgap).
• Commodity prices: minus hp-filtered trend, absolute value, Bank of Canada (bcne, bcpi)
• Risk: political risk (polity index), International Country Risk Guide measures of institutional quality 
(various sub-indices), financial ratings (Moody’s, S&P, EMBI)
• Fiscal deficit (surplus) relative to GDP: International Monetary Fund, IFS, World Bank (=0 if 
surplus (deficit), deficit (surplus)).
• Government debt to GDP: World Bank (debt)
• Country size: relative GDP, ppp based, World Bank (csize).
• Trade openness: exports + imports relative to GDP, International Monetary Fund, IFS (tradeo).
Financial environment control variables (ENV):
• Financial market sophistication index: Global Competitiveness Report 2005-06 (fm_soph)
• Stock market capitalization relative to GDP: World Bank (sm_cap)
• Stock market turnover: World Bank (sm_turn)
• Soundness of private banks index: Global Competitiveness Report 2005-06 (soundness_banks)
• Private banks’ financial strength: Moody’s weighted average bank financial strength rating
(bank_fin_str)
• Market share of state-owned banks: LaPorta et al (2002) (state_owned)
Monetary policy framework variables (INST):
• Official inflation target level: Mishkin Schmidt-Hebbel (2005), includes disinflation periods 
(it_level)
• Size of inflation control range: Mishkin Schmidt-Hebbel (2005) (it_range)
• Inflation forecast horizon: Fracasso et al (2003) (horizon)
• Age: number of quarters since the start of the IT regime, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2005) 
dates (age)
• Number of inflation reports per year: Roger and Stone (2005) (ir_year)
• Provisions of quantitative forecasts of output and inflation: Roger and Stone (2005) 
(quant_forecast)
• Publication of MPC minutes: Fracasso et al (2003), central bank websites for starting dates
(minutes)
• Frequency of MPC meetings: Roger and Stone (2005) (freq_meetings)
• Use of models: models with at least 10 equations (Fry et al) (use_models)
• Size of MPC (internal, external, total): Roger and Stone (2005) (mpc_int, mpc_ext, mpc_size)
• Independence: target independence (=1 of central bank decides inflation target independently, 0 if 
not, targ_indep), instrument independence (=1 of central bank sets monetary policy 
independently, 0 if not, inst_indep) (Fry et al), governor turnover rate (Freytag 2001, Sturm and 
deHaan 2001, author’s calculation), other measures (Cukierman et al, 1992)25
Selected descriptive statistics for INST31
31 Time-varying variables are reported at sample mean. This explains why, for example, Canada has a value of 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Cross-section model (at mean)
Dependent variable: absolute inflation deviations (aid)










Table 6: Pooled model
Dependent variable: absolute inflation deviations (aid)





aexgap t-1 0.040 5.37









Table 7: Fixed effects model
Dependent variable: absolute inflation deviations (aid)





aexgap t-1 0.032 4.02





Table 8: Fixed effects model (instrumental variables)
Dependent variable: absolute inflation deviations (aid)





aexgap t-1 0.027 3.23




Table 9: Absolute loss model (pooled)
Dependent variable: absolute loss (loss)









a_exch_gap t-1 0.018 2.60





Table 10: Quadratic loss model (pooled)
Dependent variable: quadratic loss (loss_2)














Table 11: Quadratic loss model (pooled, Cecchetti-Krause weights)
Dependent variable: Cecchetti-Krause loss (loss_ck)






aexgap t-1 0.218 4.18
aexgap t-4 0.141 2.89
aoilgap t-1 0.038 1.75






Table 12:Potential determinants and their correlation with inflation deviations or loss
Inflation deviations Loss
MACRO
Output deviations ns +
Exchange rate deviations + +
Price of oil deviations ns +, small
Commodity price deviations ns ns
Country risk premium ns ns
Fiscal deficit/GDP + +
Fiscal surplus/GDP ns -
Government debt/GDP ns ns
Country size ns ns
Trade openness ns ns
ENV
Financial market development
Financial market sophistication index ns ns
Stock market capitalization/GDP ns ns
Stock market turnover/GDP ns ns
Banking sector health
Private banks soundness index - ns
Private banks financial strength index - ns
Market share of state-owned banks ns +, small
INST
IT design
Inflation target level + +
Size of inflation target range + +
Inflation control horizon -, small ns
Age of the IT regime ns ns
Transparency
Number of inflation reports per year ns ns
Provision of quantitative forecasts ns ns
Publication of MPC minutes + +
Other
Frequency of official MPC meetings ns -, small
Use of models ns -
Size of MPC -, small ns
Central bank independence - ns
“+”, “-”, and “ns” mean that regression results (from Tables 5-11)indicate positive, negative, and no correlation
between the variable and absolute inflation deviations and loss, respectively. “small” is added when the effect is 
judged economically small. See Appendix 2 for a definition of the variables.